Single-peaked preferences are important throughout social choice theory. In this article, we consider single-peaked preferences over multidimensional binary alternative spaces-that is, alternative spaces of the form {0, 1} n for some integer n ≥ 2. We show that preferences that are single-peaked with respect to a normalized separable base order are nonseparable except in the most trivial cases. We establish that two distinct base orders can induce the same single-peaked preference order if any only if they differ by a transposition of their two central elements. We then use this result to enumerate single-peaked binary preference orders over a separable base order.
Introduction
Single-peaked preferences are important throughout social choice theory, perhaps most famously because of their use in the well-known Median Voter Theorem [2, 14] . Intuitively, a voter is said to have single-peaked preferences if there is an ideal outcome that they prefer the most, and alternatives that are further away from this ideal outcome (according to some linear ordering) are less preferred. The notion of preferences being single-peaked assumes, in essence, a one-dimensional set of alternatives. However, alternative spaces are sometimes multidimensional. For instance, in referendum elections, voters are often required to vote simultaneously on multiple questions or proposals. For an election on n ≥ 2 proposals, the set of possible outcomes is not only multidimensional, but discrete as well; in particular, each outcome is an element of {0, 1} n -that is, an ordered n-tuple of zeros and ones.
Although there has been some research on multidimensional analogs of single-peaked preferences (see, for instance, [1] ), little work has done within the specific context of multidimensional, binary alternative spaces. Golenbiewski, Hodge, and Moats [7] studied cost-conscious voters-that is, voters who wish to limit total spending to a fixed amount-in referendum elections. Their formulation of cost-consciousness yields preferences that are single-peaked with respect to cost. Here we develop a more general model and consider its practical and theoretical implications.
In Section 2, we define the notion of single-peaked preferences for multidimensional binary alternative spaces. We then explore the relationship between our model and the notion of cost-consciousness proposed by Golenbiewski et al. [7] .
In Section 3, we discuss separability of multidimensional preferences, and in Section 4, we relate separability to singlepeakedness. In Section 5, we prove several structural results, and we use these results to enumerate single-peaked binary preference orders over a separable base order. In Section 6, we summarize our work and suggest directions for further research.
Single-peaked preferences and cost-consciousness
We begin by adopting a slight variation of the preference model used by Bradley, Hodge, and Kilgour [3] , which is based on that of Yu [16] . We assume the context of a decision problem on a finite criteria set Q = {1, 2, . . . , n}, where n ≥ 2. By an alternative, we mean an element of {0, 1} n -that is, an n-tuple (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ), where x i ∈ {0, 1} for each i. 1 We denote by X the set of all such alternatives, noting that |X| = 2 n . If S is a nonempty, proper subset of Q and x ∈ X , then we let x S denote the components of x corresponding to the criteria in S. In this way, we can denote any alternative x ∈ X by (x S , x −S ), where −S denotes the complement of S in Q . We use the notations 0 S and 1 S to denote the |S|-tuples consisting of all zeros or all ones, so that, for example, (1 S , 0 −S ) denotes the alternative x for which x i = 1 for all i ∈ S and x i = 0 for all i ̸ ∈ S. Example 1. Let Q = {1, 2, 3, 4}. Consider the alternative x = 1010, and let S = {1, 3}. Then x S = x {1,3} = 11 and x −S = x {2,4} = 00. Thus, x = (1 S , 0 −S ).
A strict total order on X is called a binary preference order for Q . We typically use the symbols ≪ and ≺ to denote binary preference orders (and ≫ and ≻ to denote their respective inverse orders). When we write x ≼ y, we mean that x ≺ y or x = y. The symbols ≽, ≤ ≤, and ≥ ≥ are defined similarly.
The binary preference orders of interest to us here are those that are single-peaked, defined formally as follows. Definition 1. Let ≪ and ≺ be binary preference orders for Q , and label the elements x i of X so that
Then ≺ is said to be single-peaked with respect to ≪ if there exists an alternative x * = x k ∈ X such that
In this case, x * is said to be the peak for ≺.
Note that Definition 1 implies that ≺ is single-peaked with respect to ≪ if and only if ≺ is single-peaked with respect to ≫ (the inverse of ≪). Example 2. Let Q = {1, 2, 3}, and let ≪ be the binary preference order defined by 000 ≪ 100 ≪ 010 ≪ 001 ≪ 110 ≪ 101 ≪ 011 ≪ 111.
Let ≺ be the binary preference order defined by 111 ≺ 011 ≺ 101 ≺ 000 ≺ 100 ≺ 010 ≺ 001 ≺ 110.
Then ≺ is single-peaked with respect to ≪, with peak x * = 110, since 000 ≺ 100 ≺ 010 ≺ 001 ≺ 110 ≻ 101 ≻ 011 ≻ 111.
Although single-peaked preferences have applications throughout social choice theory, the primary motivation for the present work comes from the context of multiple-question referendum elections, and specifically the study of cost-conscious voters within such elections. In this context, Q represents a set of yes-no questions or proposals, so that each x ∈ X denotes a possible election outcome, with a 1 in the ith component of x denoting passage of proposal i and a 0 denoting failure.
In this context, Golenbiewski et al. [7] conceptualized cost-conscious voters as those who support each proposal in principle but desire to limit total spending to some fixed amount or cost ceiling. The model developed by Golenbiewski et al. naturally yields single-peaked preferences with respect to cost-that is, with respect to the order ≪ in which x ≪ y if and only if the total cost of passing outcome x is less than the total cost of passing outcome y. In particular, a cost-conscious voter's total utility increases monotonically with cost up to the voter's cost ceiling, and then decreases monotonically beyond that point. Thus, any cost-conscious voter can be viewed as having single-peaked preferences, with the peak occurring at the outcome whose cost is closest to, but does not exceed, the voter's cost ceiling.
It is important to note that the model of cost-consciousness proposed by Golenbiewski et al. is significantly more restrictive than Definition 1, in that it requires all outcomes whose costs exceed the cost ceiling to be less preferred than all outcomes whose costs do not exceed the cost ceiling. Note that Definition 1 imposes no such requirement. Indeed, while
there is no requirement with regard to the relative ordering of x i and x j when x i ≪ x * ≪ x j -that is, when x i and x j are on opposite sides of the peak. Thus, singlepeaked preferences in the context of referendum elections provide a more robust and flexible model of cost-consciousness.
Separability
Note that every binary preference order is single-peaked with respect to itself, with the peak at x 2 n . Therefore, any meaningful attempt to characterize or enumerate collections of single-peaked preferences must focus on preferences that are single-peaked with respect to an underlying order that satisfies certain reasonable restrictions. For our purposes, we will impose the condition of separability, defined formally as follows.
Definition 2. Let ≪ be a binary preference order for Q , and let S be a nonempty, proper subset of Q . Then S is said to be separable with respect to ≪, or simply ≪-separable, provided that
If each nonempty S ⊂ Q is separable with respect to ≪, then ≪ is said to be completely separable, or simply separable.
Separability is important in many fields, including economics, political science, operations research, and computer science. (See [9] for a summary.) Intuitively, an agent's preferences are separable if they do not exhibit dimensional interdependencies-that is, if the agent's preferences over the alternatives on each criterion or set of criteria do not depend on the choice of alternatives on other criteria. The next example illustrates the definition of separability.
Example 3. Let Q , ≪, and ≺ be as defined in Example 2. Note that 010 ≺ 110 but 101 ≺ 001. Letting S = {1}, u −S = 10, and v −S = 01, we see
From this point forward, we will focus our attention on preferences that are single-peaked with respect to an underlying base order ≪ that is both separable and satisfies a normalization condition-namely that
for all nonempty S ⊂ Q and all v −S (as in Example 3). We incur no loss of generality by restricting our attention to normalized base orders. In addition, normalization is consistent with the assumption of Golenbiewski et al. [7] that cost-conscious voters support all proposals in principle. Finally, defining a base order to be separable allows us to isolate the nonseparability that is induced by single-peakedness-which, as we will see shortly, is significant even when the underlying base order is completely separable.
The next definition states our assumptions formally.
Definition 3.
A base order for Q is a separable binary preference order ≪ for Q such that
for all nonempty S ⊂ Q and all v −S . A binary preference order ≺ is said to be single-peaked if there exists a base order ≪ such that ≺ is single-peaked with respect to ≪.
It is a simple consequence of Definition 3 that if ≺ is a single-peaked binary preference order for Q , then either 0 Q or 1 Q is minimal with respect to ≺.
Single-peaked preferences, separability, and voting
Before moving on to the task of enumerating single-peaked preference orders, we will first note a few basic results about single-peaked preferences, all of which are generalizations of results from Golenbiewski et al. [7] . The first elaborates on our earlier claim that single-peaked preferences can be highly nonseparable, even though the underlying base orders are completely separable. Its proof relies on a straightforward lemma. Lemma 1. Let ≺ be a binary preference order for Q . Then a nonempty subset S ⊂ Q is separable with respect to ≺ if and only if S is separable with respect to ≻ (the inverse of ≺). Consequently, ≺ is separable if and only if ≻ is separable. Theorem 1. Let ≪ be a base order for Q , and let ≺ be single-peaked with respect to ≪, with peak x * .
(i) The order ≺ is completely separable if and only if x * = 0 Q or x * = 1 Q .
Proof. For (i), we begin with the reverse implication. If x * = 1 Q , then ≺=≪, and so ≺ is separable. If x * = 0 Q , then ≺ is the inverse of ≪, and is thus separable by Lemma 1. For the forward implication, suppose x * ̸ = 0 Q and x * ̸ = 1 Q . Then
In the first case, Definition 1 implies that
which implies that −S is not separable with respect to ≺. In the second case, Definition 1 implies that
which implies that S is not separable with respect to ≺. In either case, there exists a proper, nonempty subset S of Q such that S is not separable with respect to ≺.
Now consider two cases.
Since
But then (2) and (3) together contradict the ≺-separability of S.
If y −S = 1 −S , then (4) implies that
But then (5) and (6) together contradict the ≺-separability of S. Now suppose y −S ̸ = 1 −S . Since y S ̸ = 1 S , the normalization of ≪ implies that
By Definition 1, it follows that
But then (5) and (8) together contradict the ≺-separability of S. Since each case leads to a contradiction, the proof is complete.
Theorem 1 implies that single-peaked preferences exhibit some degree of nonseparability except in the trivial cases where the peak is either minimal or maximal with respect to ≪. For example, consider any preference order ≻ that is single-peaked with respect to the base order
with peak x * = 101. The only nonempty subsets of {1, 2, 3} that could possibly be separable with respect to ≻ are {2, 3} and {3}, since these are the only sets that meet the conditions in part (ii) of Theorem 1.
In the context of referendum elections, nonseparability has been shown to lead to unsatisfactory and even paradoxical election results, such as an outcome that is the least preferred choice of every voter. (See, for example, [4, 5, 7, 11, 13] .) In spite of the possibility of selecting poor outcomes due to the nonseparability of single-peaked preferences, the Median Voter Theorem [2, 14] implies that, for electorates whose members all have single-peaked preferences over a common base order, there is always at least one outcome-in particular, a weak Condorcet winner 2 -that voters will view favorably in comparison to other alternatives. Likewise, for any electorate consisting entirely of voters with single-peaked preferences, there is always a weak Condorcet loser-in our case, either 0 Q or 1 Q . (Note that these results hold not only for multidimensional binary preferences, but in more general contexts as well.) The challenge, then, is to design election mechanisms that select the former and avoid the latter, thereby minimizing the detrimental effects of nonseparability.
Enumeration of single-peaked preferences
In this section, we will turn our attention to the problem of enumerating single-peaked preference orders. In general, counting problems associated with separable preferences tend to be difficult. For instance, there is no known closed formula for the number of separable binary preference orders as a function of n, and exact counts are known only for n ≤ 7 (see [10] ).
Our goal here is not to address the problem of counting separable preference orders. Rather, we will determine the number of single-peaked binary preference orders as a function of both n and an additional parameter p n , which denotes the number of normalized, separable base orders for a criteria set of cardinality n.
We begin by counting the number of single-peaked preference orders corresponding to any given base order.
Note that 1 ≤ pos ≪ (x) ≤ 2 n , with the minimum and maximum elements of X (with respect to ≪) assuming the extreme values. Also note that if we label the elements x i of X so that
Finally, the order ≪ is uniquely determined by the sequence of ≪-positions assigned to the elements of X .
When comparing the positions of an alternative x with respect to two orders, say ≪ 1 and ≪ 2 , we will often abbreviate pos ≪ 1 (x) and pos ≪ 2 (x) by pos 1 (x) and pos 2 (y), respectively. For any base order ≪, we let SP(≪) denote the set of all binary preference orders that are single-peaked with respect to ≪.
The following result is an immediate consequence of Lemma 2 in Escoffier et al. [6] .
If the sets SP(≪ 1 ) and SP(≪ 2 ) were disjoint whenever ≪ 1 ̸ = ≪ 2 , then counting the number of single-peaked preferences would be as simple as multiplying 2 2 n −1 by the number of base orders for Q . Unfortunately, however, it is possible for SP(≪ 1 ) and SP(≪ 2 ) to intersect nontrivially, as demonstrated in the next example. Then the order ≺ defined by 111 ≺ 011 ≺ 101 ≺ 000 ≺ 100 ≺ 010 ≺ 001 ≺ 110 is single-peaked with respect to both ≪ 1 and ≪ 2 , with peak x * = 110. Thus, SP(≪ 1 )∩SP(≪ 2 ) ̸ = ∅, even though ≪ 1 ̸ = ≪ 2 . When SP(≪ 1 ) ∩ SP(≪ 2 ) ̸ = ∅, we say that ≪ 1 and ≪ 2 overlap. We now turn our attention to the task of characterizing the ways in which distinct base orders can overlap.
First, we note that the symmetric group S 2 n acts on the set of all binary preference orders for Q by permuting the positions of the elements. (See [8] for an extensive treatment of permutations acting on separable preference orders.) In particular, if σ ∈ S 2 n and ≪ is a binary preference order for Q , then we define σ (≪) to be the ordering ≪ ′ for which pos ≪ ′ (x) = σ (pos ≪ (x)) for all x ∈ X . We call τ c = (2 n−1 , 2 n−1 + 1) the central transposition. (Note that τ c , when applied to a preference order, simply swaps the positions of the middle two elements.) Using this notation, we can observe that, in Example 4, ≪ 2 = τ c (≪ 1 ). This observation is a consequence of the following more general result. 
Theorem 3 is not obvious, and it requires a fair amount of work to prove. Thus, we will begin by proving several useful lemmas.
Definition 5.
For any x ∈ X , the complement of x is the alternative x such that
A binary preference order ≪ is said to be symmetric provided that for all x, y ∈ S,
Note that a binary preference order ≪ is symmetric if and only if, for all x ∈ X , pos ≪ (x) = 2 n + 1 − pos ≪ (x). The following lemma, due to Bradley, Hodge, and Kilgour [3] , establishes a relationship between separability and symmetry.
Lemma 2. Let ≪ be a binary preference order for Q . If ≪ is separable, then ≪ is symmetric.
Note that Definition 3 and Lemma 2 together imply that every base order is symmetric. Definition 6. Let ≪ be a binary preference order for Q and let x, y, z ∈ X . Then y is said to be ≪-between x and z if x ≪ y ≪ z or z ≪ y ≪ x. Lemma 3. Let ≪ 1 and ≪ 2 be overlapping base orders for Q , and let ≺ be a single-peaked order in SP(≪ 1 ) ∩ SP(≪ 2 ) with peak x * . Then an alternative y ∈ X is ≪ 1 -between x * and x * if and only if y is ≪ 2 -between x * and x * .
Proof. Suppose, to the contrary, that there is an alternative y ∈ X that is ≪ 1 -between x * and x * but not ≪ 2 -between x * and x * . Without loss of generality, assume that x * ≪ 1 y ≪ 1 x * . By symmetry, it is also the case that x * ≪ 1 y ≪ 1 x * . Since ≺ is single-peaked with respect to ≪ 1 , it follows that x * ≺ y and x * ≺ y.
Since y is not ≪ 2 -between x * and x * , one of the following must be true:
In each of these cases, the fact that ≺ is single-peaked with respect to ≪ 2 requires that either y ≺ x * or y ≺ x * , a contradiction to (9) . Lemma 3 implies the following corollaries. Corollary 1. Let ≪ 1 and ≪ 2 be overlapping base orders for Q , and let ≺ be a single-peaked order in SP(≪ 1 ) ∩ SP(≪ 2 ) with peak x * . Then either pos 1 (x * ) = pos 2 (x * ) or pos 2 (x * ) = pos 1 (x * ) = 2 n + 1 − pos 1 (x * ). Proof. Lemma 3 implies that the number of elements that are ≪ 1 -between x * and x * is the same as the number of elements that are ≪ 2 -between x * and x * . The result then follows from the fact that both ≪ 1 and ≪ 2 are symmetric (by Lemma 2). Corollary 2. Let ≪ 1 and ≪ 2 be overlapping base orders for Q , and let ≺ be a single-peaked order in SP(≪ 1 ) ∩ SP(≪ 2 ) with peak x * . Suppose also that pos 1 (x * ) = pos 2 (x * ). If an alternative y ∈ X is both ≪ 1 -between and ≪ 2 -between x * and x * , then pos 1 (y) = pos 2 (y).
Proof. Suppose, to the contrary, that pos 1 (x * ) = pos 2 (x * ) and pos 1 (y) ̸ = pos 2 (y). Then, by Lemma 3, there must exist z ∈ X such that one of the following holds:
In each of these cases, the fact that ≺ is single-peaked with respect to both ≪ 1 and ≪ 2 implies that both y ≺ z and z ≺ y, a contradiction.
In the next lemma (and subsequent results), we will use the notation a ≪ b, c ≪ d to denote that a ≪ b ≪ d and a ≪ c ≪ d. Lemma 4. Let ≪ 1 and ≪ 2 be overlapping base orders for Q , and let ≺ be a single-peaked order in SP(≪ 1 ) ∩ SP(≪ 2 ) with peak x * . Suppose there exists y ∈ X such that y ≪ 1 x * , x * ≪ 1 y and y ≪ 2 x * , x * ≪ 2 y.
Then pos 2 (y) = pos 1 (y) = 2 n + 1 − pos 1 (y). Proof. Suppose, to the contrary, that pos 2 (y) ̸ = pos 1 (y). Lemma 3 implies that there exists z ∈ X such that one of the following is true:
Recall that ≺ is single-peaked with respect to both ≪ 1 and ≪ 2 . If (i) holds, then y ≺ z ≺ y (since y ≪ 1 z ≪ 1 x * and z ≪ 2 y ≪ 2 x * ) and y ≺ z ≺ y (since x * ≪ 1 z ≪ 1 y and x * ≪ 2 y ≪ 2 z). This, however, is a contradiction. Likewise, if (iii) holds, we obtain z ≺ y ≺ z and z ≺ y ≺ z.
If (ii) holds, then we have y ≺ z (since y ≪ 1 z ≪ 1 x * ) and z ≺ y (since x * ≪ 2 y ≪ 2 z). Similarly, if (iv) holds, then y ≺ z (since x * ≪ 2 z ≪ 2 y) and z ≺ y (since z ≪ 1 y ≪ 1 x * ). Since we obtain a contradiction in each of these four cases, it must be that pos 2 (y) = pos 1 (y). Lemma 5. Let ≪ 1 and ≪ 2 be overlapping base orders for Q , and let ≺ be a single-peaked order in SP(≪ 1 ) ∩ SP(≪ 2 ) with peak x * . Suppose y ∈ X such that one of the following holds:
(i) y ≪ 1 x * ≪ 1 x * and y ≪ 2 x * ≪ 2 x * (ii) y ≪ 1 x * ≪ 1 x * and y ≪ 2 x * ≪ 2 x * (iii) x * ≪ 1 x * ≪ 1 y and x * ≪ 2 x * ≪ 2 y (iv) x * ≪ 1 x * ≪ 1 y and x * ≪ 2 x * ≪ 2 y. Then pos 1 (y) = pos 2 (y).
Proof. We will prove the result assuming (i). A similar argument establishes each of the other cases. Thus, assume that
and
Suppose, to the contrary, that pos 1 (y) ̸ = pos 2 (y). Without loss of generality, assume that pos 1 (y) < pos 2 (y).
Since ≺ is single-peaked with respect to both ≪ 1 and ≪ 2 , there does not exist z ∈ X such that z ≪ 2 y ≪ 2 x * and y ≪ 1 z ≪ 1 x * .
(If there were such a z, then Definition 1 would imply that both z ≺ y and y ≺ z.) Therefore, for each z ∈ X such that z ≪ 2 y ≪ 2 x * , either z ≪ 1 y or z ≫ 1 x * . Symmetry then implies that for all z ≪ 2 y, either z ≪ 1 y or z ≪ 1 x * .
We will now prove the following claim.
Claim. If z ≪ 2 y ≪ 2 x * and z ≪ 1 x * , then z ≪ 1 y.
Suppose z ≪ 2 y ≪ 2 x * and z ≪ 1 x * . (Recall that we also assumed in (10) that y ≪ 1 x * ≪ 1 x * .) Then one of the following must be true:
Therefore, by symmetry and the fact that x * ≪ 2 x * (by (11)), it follows that x * ≪ 2 x * ≪ 2 y ≪ 2 z. But ≺ is single-peaked with respect to ≪ 2 , and so it must be that z ≺ x * , a contradiction since we argued earlier that x * ≺ z.
If y ≪ 1 z ≪ 1 x * ≪ 1 x * , then by symmetry, x * ≪ 1 x * ≪ 1 z ≪ 1 y. Also, by symmetry and the assumption that z ≪ 2 y ≪ 2 x * (and x * ≪ 2 x * ), it follows that x * ≪ 2 y ≪ 2 z. Since ≺ is single-peaked with respect to both ≪ 1 and ≪ 2 , Definition 1 implies that y ≺ z ≺ y (since x * ≪ 1 z ≪ 1 y and z ≪ 2 y ≪ 2 x * ) and y ≺ z ≺ y (since y ≪ 1 z ≪ 1 x * and x * ≪ 2 y ≪ 2 z), a contradiction. Since both (i) and (ii) lead to a contradiction, it must be that (iii) holds-in particular, z ≪ 1 y. Thus, our claim is true. Recall from (12) that for each z ∈ X such that z ≪ 2 y ≪ 2 x * , either z ≪ 1 y or z ≪ 1 x * . Combining this fact with the claim we just proved, we see that for each z ∈ X such that z ≪ 2 y ≪ 2 x * , either z ≪ 1 y or z ≪ 1 y. This, however, implies that |X ≪ 1 (y)| ≥ |X ≪ 2 (y)|, a contradiction to the assumption that pos 1 (y) < pos 2 (y). Therefore, pos 1 (y) = pos 2 (y), as desired.
For the purposes of the next lemma, we will call an alternative y ∈ X a bottom alternative for ≪ if pos ≪ (y) ≤ 2 n−1 . Likewise, we will call y ∈ X a top alternative for ≪ if pos ≪ (y) > 2 n−1 . Note that y is a bottom alternative if and only if y is a top alternative. Definition 7. Let ≪ 1 and ≪ 2 be binary preference orders for Q . Then ≪ 1 and ≪ 2 are said to be complementary if for each y ∈ X , either pos 2 (y) = pos 1 (y) or pos 2 (y) = pos 1 (y) = 2 n + 1 − pos 1 (y). Note that if ≪ 1 and ≪ 2 are complementary base orders, then ≪ 1 and ≪ 2 differ at most by transpositions of complementary alternatives. Furthermore, if y ∈ X is a bottom (or top) alternative for both ≪ 1 and ≪ 2 , then pos 1 (y) = pos 2 (y).
Complementarity induces an equivalence relation on the set of all binary preference orders for Q . Furthermore, every order ≪ is, by definition, complementary with its inverse ≫. These observations yield the following lemma. Proof. Suppose ≪ 1 and ≪ 2 overlap, and let ≺ be a single-peaked order in SP(≪ 1 ) ∩ SP(≪ 2 ) with peak x * . By Corollary 1, if pos 2 (x * ) ̸ = pos 1 (x * ), then pos 2 (x * ) = pos 1 (x * ) = 2 n + 1 − pos 1 (x * ). Thus, we may assume, without loss of generality, that pos 2 (x * ) = pos 1 (x * ). (If this is not the case, then a similar argument establishes that ≫ 1 and ≪ 2 are complementary, which is equivalent to what we need to show.) 3 For all y ∈ X with y ̸ = x * , y satisfies the hypotheses of either Corollary 2, Lemma 4, or Lemma 5. Therefore, for all y ∈ X , pos 2 (y) = pos 1 (y) or pos 2 (y) = pos 1 (y) = 2 n + 1 − pos 1 (y), as desired.
Lemma 8. Let ≪ 1 and ≪ 2 be complementary base orders for Q . Then there do not exist x, y ∈ X such that
Proof. Suppose, to the contrary, that there do exist x, y ∈ X such that both (13) and (14) hold. Let S = {i ∈ Q : x i = y i }. (Note that S is the set of criteria on which x and y agree.) Since x and y are distinct and not complements of each other, S is a nonempty, proper subset of Q . Furthermore, there exist u S , v −S such that
By (14),
Since both ≪ 1 is separable, we can replace u S with any other outcome z S in (15) to obtain
By similar arguments, it follows that:
Now consider two cases. 
Thus, (u S , 1 −S ) is a top alternative for both ≪ 1 and ≪ 2 . Since ≪ 1 and ≪ 2 are complementary, it must be that pos 1 (u S , 1 −S ) = pos 2 (u S , 1 −S ) or pos 1 (u S , 1 −S ) = 2 n + 1 − pos 2 (u S , 1 −S ). However, since (u S , 1 −S ) is a top alternative for both ≪ 1 and ≪ 2 , it must be that pos 1 (20)), and pos 1 (u S , 1 −S ) = pos 2 (u S , 1 −S ), we can conclude that pos 1 (u S , 1 −S ) ̸ = pos 2 (u S , 1 −S ). It follows by complementarity that pos 1 
. This, however, is a contradiction to the fact that ≪ 2 is normalized.
and so (1 S , v −S ) is also a top alternative for ≪ 1 . By (19) and the normalization of ≪ 2 ,
Thus, (1 S , v −S ) is a top alternative for both ≪ 1 and ≪ 2 , which implies (by complementarity, as in Case 1) that
Thus, it must be the case that pos 1 (1 S , v −S ) ̸ = pos 2 (1 S , v −S ), and so (by complementarity) pos 1 
, a contradiction to the normalization of ≪ 2 .
Lemma 9. Let ≪ 1 and ≪ 2 be distinct overlapping base orders for Q , and let ≺ be a single-peaked order in SP(≪ 1 ) ∩ SP(≪ 2 )
with peak x * . Then
Proof. Suppose, to the contrary, that pos 1 (x * ) ̸ ∈ {2 n−1 , 2 n−1 + 1} or pos 2 (x * ) ̸ ∈ {2 n−1 , 2 n−1 + 1}. Then pos 1 (x * ) < 2 n−1 , pos 1 (x * ) > 2 n−1 + 1, pos 2 (x * ) < 2 n−1 , or pos 2 (x * ) > 2 n−1 + 1. Assume, without loss of generality, that pos 1 (x * ) < 2 n−1 . Then, by symmetry, pos 1 (x * ) > 2 n−1 + 1. Furthermore, Corollary 1 implies that either pos 2 (x * ) = pos 1 (x * ) or pos 2 (x * ) = pos 1 (x * ) = 2 n + 1 − pos 1 (x * ). Consider these two cases. Case 1: pos 2 (x * ) = pos 1 (x * ) < 2 n−1 . Since ≪ 1 and ≪ 2 are complementary (by Lemma 7) and ≪ 1 ̸ = ≪ 2 , there exists y ∈ X such that pos 2 (y) = pos 1 (y). By Lemma 3 and Corollary 2, y is neither ≪ 1 -between nor ≪ 2 -between x * and x * . Without loss of generality, assume that y ≪ 1 x * . Then
This, however, is a contradiction to Lemma 8.
Case 2: pos 2 (x * ) = pos 1 (x * ) = 2 n + 1 − pos 1 (x * ). Then pos 2 (x * ) = pos 1 (x * ). Since we assumed that pos 1 (x * ) < 2 n−1 , there must exist y ∈ X such that x * ≪ 1 y, y ≪ 1 x * . In other words, both y and y are ≪ 1 -between x * and x * . By Lemma 3, y and y are also ≪ 2 -between x * and x * . But then our assumption that pos 2 (x * ) = pos 1 (x * ) implies that x * ≪ 2 y, y ≪ 2 x * , a contradiction to Lemma 8.
Since each case leads to a contradiction, our assumption that pos 1 
must be false. Thus,
as desired.
We are now ready to prove Theorem 3.
Proof of Theorem 3. Let ≪ 1 and ≪ 2 be distinct base orders for Q . For the forward implication, suppose that ≪ 1 and ≪ 2 overlap, and let ≺ be a single-peaked order in SP(≪ 1 ) ∩ SP(≪ 2 ) with peak x * . By Lemma 9,
This, however, implies that pos 1 (x * ), pos 2 (x * ) ∈ {2 n−1 , 2 n−1 + 1} as well. By Lemma 7, ≪ 1 and ≪ 2 are complementary. Thus, for each y ∈ X , either pos 2 (y) = pos 1 (y) or pos 2 (y) = pos 1 (y) = 2 n + 1 − pos 1 (y). Now suppose y ̸ ∈ {x * , x * }, and assume without loss of generality that y ≪ 1 x * . If pos 2 (y) = pos 1 (y), then y ≪ 1 x * , x * ≪ 1 y and y ≪ 2 x * , x * ≪ 2 y, a contradiction to Lemma 8. Thus, it must be the case that pos 1 (y) = pos 2 (y) for all y ̸ ∈ {x * , x * }. Since ≪ 1 ̸ = ≪ 2 , it follows that pos 2 (x * ) = pos 1 (x * ) (and pos 2 (x * ) = pos 1 (x * )). Thus, ≪ 2 = τ c (≪ 1 ).
For the reverse implication, suppose ≪ 2 = τ c (≪ 2 ). Label the elements x i of X so that
Then let ≺ be the binary preference order defined by
Then ≺ is single-peaked with respect to both ≪ 1 and ≪ 2 , and so ≪ 1 and ≪ 2 overlap.
To count all such single-peaked orders, we first note that if ≺ is single-peaked with respect to both ≪ 1 and ≪ 2 , then
x * ∈ {x 2 n−1 , x 2 n−1 +1 }. If this is not the case, then x * = x i for some i < 2 n−1 or i > 2 n−1 + 1. In either case, Definition 1 requires both x 2 n−1 ≺ x 2 n−1 +1 and x 2 n−1 +1 ≺ x 2 n−1 , a contradiction. Thus, x * ∈ {x 2 n−1 , x 2 n−1 +1 }.
Suppose x * = x 2 n−1 , and let x ′ ∈ X be the second most preferred alternative with respect to ≺. (That is, pos ≺ (x ′ ) = 2 n −1.) Since ≺ is single-peaked with respect to ≪ 1 and x * = x 2 n−1 , x ′ must be one of the two alternatives immediately preceding or succeeding x 2 n−1 with respect to ≪ 1 . Thus,
. But ≺ is also single-peaked with respect to ≪ 2 , and so
Therefore, it must be that x ′ = x 2 n−1 +1 .
Once x * and x ′ are determined, all of the remaining alternatives are ordered identically-both with respect to each other and with respect to x * and x ′ -by ≪ 1 and ≪ 2 . Therefore, any assignment of these alternatives to the remaining 2 n − 2 ≺positions that satisfies
will yield a preference order that is single-peaked with respect to both ≪ 1 and ≪ 2 . Any such assignment is uniquely determined by the ≺-positions assigned to the alternatives x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x 2 n−1 −1 (as in the proof of Theorem 2). Thus, there are  2 n −2 2 n−1 −1  different orders that are single-peaked with respect to both ≪ 1 and ≪ 2 , and that have peak x 2 n−1 . A similar argument yields the same result when x * = x 2 n−1 +1 . Therefore,
Having established Theorem 3, we can now prove our main result. Our proof relies on the following lemma, which is adapted from Hodge [8] .
Lemma 10. Let ≪ be a base order for Q . Then τ c (≪) is also a base order for Q . Theorem 4. Let |Q | = n, let p n denote the number of base orders for Q , and let SP n denote the set of all single-peaked preference orders for Q . Then
Proof. Theorem 2 establishes |SP(≪)| for any base order ≪. By Lemma 10, there are p n /2 pairs of base orders (say ≪ 1 and ≪ 2 ) such that ≪ 2 = τ c (≪ 1 ). Furthermore, Theorem 3 states that ≪ 1 and ≪ 2 overlap if and only if ≪ 2 = τ c (≪ 1 ). Theorem 3 also establishes |SP(≪ 1 ) ∩ SP(≪ 2 )| for each such overlapping pair. Thus, by the Principle of Inclusion-Exclusion,
The table below lists the number of base orders and single-peaked orders for 2 ≤ n ≤ 4.
n # of base orders |SP n | It is worth noting that the first three terms in the |SP n | sequence do not correspond to any entries in the Online Encyclopedia of Integer Sequences [15] . It is also worth noting that since the minimal element of any single-peaked preference order is either 0 Q or 1 Q -a significant restriction-it is easy to show that the proportion of preference orders that are single-peaked approaches zero asymptotically as n increases. In contrast, Hodge and TerHaar [12] have shown that the proportion of preference orders that are completely nonseparable approaches 1 asymptotically. Thus, while single-peaked preferences are almost always nonseparable (by Theorem 1), single-peakedness cannot be claimed to fully account for-or even to account for in any significant way-the presence of nonseparability within multidimensional binary preferences.
Summary and future research
Single-peaked preferences are important and interesting, both for their practical applications and for the mathematical questions pertaining to them. In this article, we developed a model of single-peaked preferences over multidimensional binary alternative spaces. This model generalizes the notion of cost-consciousness proposed by Golenbiewski et al. [7] in the context of voting on referendum elections, but it may have other applications as well. (Consider, for instance, arranging political candidates on a left-right spectrum according to their views-liberal or conservative-on a number of issues.)
The majority of our work focused on counting single-peaked preference orders. This problem may not have as many practical implications as some others, but it is interesting from a mathematical point of view. Moreover, the relative rarity of single-peaked preferences suggests the need to further model the causes of nonseparability, particularly within the context of referendum elections.
Our results focused on preferences that are single-peaked with respect to a normalized, separable total order. These conditions could be relaxed in future work. For instance, conditions related to but not equivalent to separability-such as additivity-may be of significance in some applications. In addition, allowing alternative spaces to be weakly ordered, rather than totally ordered, would potentially provide a more flexible and robust model, while also giving rise to a number of interesting combinatorial questions.
